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Abstract
In this technical report, we present an application of the structured ar-
gumentation methodology to a debate in the foundations of mathematics.
We work with ASPIC-END, a recently proposed adaptation of the struc-
tured argumentation framework ASPIC+ which can incorporate debates
about logical principles, natural deduction style arguments and explana-
tions. We apply this framework to build a preliminary formal model of
parts of the debate that mathematicians had about the Axiom of Choice
in the early 20th century. Furthermore, we briefly discuss the insight into
the strengths and drawbacks of the modeling capacities of ASPIC-END
that we have gained from producing this model.
1 Introduction
Structured argumentation theory allows for a fine-grained model of argumen-
tation and argumentative reasoning based on a formal language in which ar-
guments and counterarguments can be constructed. In this technical report,
we present preliminary results on the applicability of structured argumentation
theory to argumentation about the foundations of mathematics.
The work presented in this technical report is based on the ASPIC+ frame-
work for structured argumentation [see Modgil and Prakken, 2014]. In a recent
wokshop paper [see Dauphin and Cramer, 2017] we have proposed some adap-
tations to ASPIC+ that were mainly motivated by the goal to model arguments
and explanations presented in the literature on philosophical logic. These adap-
tations gave rise to the modified structured argumentation framework ASPIC-
END.
In this technical report, we present a model that formalizes parts of the
debate that mathematicians had about the Axiom of Choice in the early 20th
century [see Moore, 1982]. In 1904, the German mathematician Ernst Zermelo
published a proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem, in which he explicitly refered
to a set-theoretic principle that came to be known as the Axiom of Choice
Zermelo [1904]. In the first years after its publication, this proof received a
lot of critique, a significant part of which questioned the general validity of the
Axiom of Choice (see Moore [1982]). In the long run, however, the proof got
accepted, as the Axiom of Choice got accepted as a valid part of the de-facto
standard foundational theory for mathematics, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with
the Axiom of Choice (ZFC ).
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The two critiques of Zermelo’s Axiom of Choice that we consider in this
paper are those of Peano [1906] and Lebesgue [see Hadamard et al., 1905].
Furthermore, we consider the counterarguments to these cirtiques put forward
by Zermelo [1907] and by Hadamard [see Hadamard et al., 1905]. Given that
the model still leaves out many contributions to that debate and additionally
simplifies some of the contributions that it does take into account, we consider
it to only be a preliminary model that we plan to extend in the future. However,
we hope that this more extensive model gives some insight into the strengths
and drawbacks of the modeling capacities of ASPIC-END, as well as inspiration
for further research into this direction.
In Section 9, we discuss how the model could be extended in order to provide
a more complete picture of the debate and to link it to debates on related topics
within the foundations of mathematics and logic.
2 Some general remarks of the model
We are modeling some sophisticated argumentation that often involves a lot of
implicit reasoning steps that are not made explicit. We attempt our formaliza-
tion of the arguments to be as faithful as possible to the original intention of
the authors of the arguments in question, but we cannot avoid making choices
about the implicit reasoning steps that could potentially be made differently.
Generally, the purely mathematical and purely logical demonstrations and
reasoning is formalized using intuitively strict rules, while the philosophical and
metamathematical argumentation and reasoning is formalized using defeasible
rules. Most of the attacks between arguments attack defeasible arguments,
i.e. philosophical or metamathematical arguments. But given that some of the
mathematical and logical principles that were applied in the mathematical and
logical reasoning that we model, e.g. the Axiom of Choice, the non-constructivist
parts of classical logic and the (inconsistent) set comprehension principle, are
attacked by some philosophical or metamathematical arguments, there are also
some arguments using only intuitively strict rules that get attacked. Of course,
by the design of ASPIC-END, all such attacks have to be undercuts.
All arguments have to start from some assumptions, which are not explic-
itly backed up by further arguments. Such an assumption is formalized in
our model as a premise, i.e. as a rule with no antecedent. Depending on
whether this premise is of a purely mathematico-logical nature or has philosoph-
ical/metamathematical aspects, it gets modelled either as an intuitively strict
rule without antecedent, also called an axiom, or as a defeasible rule without
antecedent, also called a defeasible premise.
Instead of presenting the language and the set of rules of our model at once,
we introduce them step by step as we show how to formalize various arguments
put forward during the debate. We explicitly mention all the rules needed
in out model. The language of our model is a standard first-order language
over a vocabulary of predicate symbols, function symbols and constants. This
vocabulary is not explicitly listed, but is evident from the list of rules that we
put forward and from the explanations we provide about the formalization. We
have chosen the names of all predicate symbols, function symbols and constants
in such a way that they resemble either the actual words used in the debate1
1All the arguments from the debate cited in this paper were originally presented in lan-
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or the words of some reformulation of the cited arguments that we use when
explaining the debate and our formalization of it.
The name of a rule, i.e. the formula that expresses the acceptability of a
rule and whose negation can be used to undercut an argumetn using the rule, is
denoted with accept(ρ), where ρ is a constant symbol that refers to the rule as a
syntactic object. For some rules we explicitly specify the constant ρ that refers
to it by writing (ρ) (for some constant symbol ρ) in front of the rule. However,
for other rules we do not specify such a constant symbol to refer to it, as it is
mostly not needed.
The inference rules of intuitionistic logic (which are also included in classical
logic) are not called into question by any mathematician involved in the debate
that we model, so these rules never get undercut. Here are the schemes of
intuitively strict rules2 that are required to model intuitionistic logic in ASPIC-
END:
(¬-Elim) ϕ,¬ϕ ⊥;
(MP ) ϕ, (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ψ;
(∧-Intro) ϕ,ψ  (ϕ ∧ ψ);
(∧-ElimL) (ϕ ∧ ψ) ϕ;
(∧-ElimR) (ϕ ∧ ψ) ψ;
(∨-IntroL) ϕ (ϕ ∨ ψ);
(∨-IntroR) ψ  (ϕ ∨ ψ);
(= -Intro)  t = t;
(= -Elim) ϕ, t1 = t2  ϕ[t1/t2]
(∀-Elim) ∀x ϕ ϕ[t/x];
(∃-Intro) ϕ[t/x] ∃x ϕ;
(∃-Elim) ∃x ϕ,∀x (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ψ
For the final rule scheme in this list, i.e. (∃-Elim), we only include in our
model those instances for which ψ does not contain x as a free variable.
Note that the conditions that ASPIC-END imposes on variable declarations
ensure that (∃-Elim) can only be applied when ψ does not have x as a free
variable.
In order to simplify the exposition of our model, we sometimes omit implicit
reasoning steps that involve only these inference rules of intuitionistic logic. We
use the notation (A1, . . . , An ` ψ) for an argument that uses multiple of these
rules to get from the conclusions of arguments A1, . . . , An to the conclusion
ψ. Since these rules can never be undercut, this omission does not lead to any
attacks on such arguments being overlooked.
guages other than English. We generally work with their translations to English provided by
Moore [1982] and Kennedy [1973]. In very few cases we have made minor modifications to the
translation that Moore made of German texts in order to make the translation more faithful
to the German original. By “actual words used in the debate” we here mean the English
translation of these words.
2In this techincal report, we use the word rule in the way in which it is usually used in
the structured argumentation literature. There is one important difference between this usage
of rule and the way the word is usually used in the logical literature outside of structured
argumentation theory: A rule, as the word is used in structured argumentation theory, is what
would normally be called an instance of a rule. For this reason, it makes sense to speak of a
rule scheme, which is what would normally be just called a rule.
3
Furthermore, we will in one place refer to the rule scheme of double negation
elimination, which, when added to the above rule schemes, gives a formalization
of classical first-order logic in ASPIC-END:
(¬¬-Elimϕ) ¬¬ϕ ϕ
3 Zermelo’s explicitation of the Axiom of Choice
Since 1871, various mathematicians had produced proofs which relied on making
infinitely many arbitrary choices, i.e. relied on what came to be known as the
Axiom of Choice (see Moore [1982], Chapter 1). However, before 1904, these
mathematicians were not aware of the fact that these proofs require a novel
mathematical principle (ibid.). The first mathematician who explicitly talked
about the problem of making infinitely many arbitrary choices was Giuseppe
Peano Peano [1890] (page 280), but Peano talked of it as something that cannot
be done, i.e. he rejected the kind of inferences that the Axiom of Choice allows.
This particular detail of his work did not influence any mathematicians other
than some of his Italian colleagues (see Moore [1982], page 76). The first time
that a mathematician made explicit reference to the problem of making infinitely
arbitrary choices while considering this a valid form of inference was the paper
of Zermelo that presented a proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem Zermelo [1904].
“even for an infinite totality of [non-empty] sets there always exist mappings
by which each set corresponds to one of its elements”
(AC) ∀M (∀m ∈M non-empty set(m) ⊃ ∃f (domain(f) = M∧∀m ∈M f(m) ∈ m)))
“this logical principle cannot be reduced to a still simpler one, but is used
everywhere in mathematical deduction without hesitation. So for example the
general validity of the theorem that the number of subsets into which a set
is partitioned is less than or equal to the number of its elements, cannot be
demonstrated otherwise than by assigning to each subset one of its elements.”
Zermelo does not explicitly explain what he means by reducing a principle
to a simpler principle, so we just take this to be a primitive notion of his meta-
mathematical reasoning, rendered in our model by the unary predicate simple.
We assume that there is a defeasible premise that asserts that (AC) is simple
in this sense. This defeasible premise is justified by the fact that Zermelo pre-
sumably put some considerable mathematical effort into attempting to reduce
(AC) to a simple principle before claiming in print that this cannot be done.3
⇒ simple(AC)
3The proof of Cohen [1963] that if ZF is consistent, then it does not prove the Axiom of
Choice, can be viewed as a confirmation of Zermelo’s claim that (AC) cannot be reduced to a
simpler principle. However, to get to this conclusion, one would still require some judgement
about the simplicity of (AC) in comparison to some other principles that have turned out to
imply it, and unlike Cohen’s proof, these judgements are not of a purely mathematico-logical
nature, and should thus be formalized using defeasible rather than intuitively strict rules. So
while progress has been made since Zermelo’s claim in 1904 that would allow us to put forward
stronger and more elaborate arguments in favour of this claim, these arguments would still be
of a defeasible nature, just like Zermelo’s original claim.
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We formalize Zermelo’s claim that his principle “is used everywhere in math-
ematical deduction without hesitation” as a conjunction of two claims, one as-
serting that (AC) is widely used in mathematical practice (formalized using
the unary predicate widely used), and one asserting that no mathematician has
called this usage to doubt (formalized using the unary predicate calls to doubt
and the function symbol usage). The first claim is backed up by the example
that he produces in the second sentence of the quotation (see the formalization
below), while the second claim is made without argument, and therefore gets
formalized as a defeasible premise:
(ρZ
04
2 )⇒ ¬∃x calls to doubt(x,usage(AC))
The theorem mentioned in the second sentence of the quotation is nowadays
usually called the Partition Principle. The content of this theorem is not relevant
for the argumentative force of the argument that Zermelo puts forward here.
All that is relevant is that he puts forward an example of a theorem from the
mathematical literature for which a proof has been published and accepted by
the community, and that this proof makes makes implicit use of the principle AC
that Zermelo is defending here. As the content of the theorem is not relevant, we
simplify the explosition of the model by replacing it by a constant symbol PP
(“Partition Principle”). Zermelo makes the claim that this theorem “cannot be
demonstrated otherwise than by assigning to each subset one of its elements”,
which we formalize as a conjunction of two claims: that there is a proof that
demonstrates PP , and that any proof that demonstrates PP uses (AC). We do
not assign any specific formal meaning to the words demonstrate and uses, but
consider them primitive concepts of Zermelo’s metamathematical reasoning.4
These two claims are not supported by a further argument, so they get modeled
as defeasible premises:5 6
⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, PP );
⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, PP ) ⊃ uses(p,AC))
Zermelo uses this example of the Partition Principle to substantiate his claim
that his principle AC is widely used in mathematical deduction. Of course, an
argument that concludes that a principle is widely used based on evidence for
one single usage of the principle is a comparatively weak argument. But it is
still stronger than making the same claim based on no evidence at all, which
is what would have been the case if Zermelo had not given this single example.
In order to formally account for this inference from a single example of a usage
4Even though he did not explicitly use a word that translates to the English word uses, his
usage of “otherwise than by” suggests that he had in mind some notion of a principle being
involved in a demonstration, which we decide to render with the word uses.
5The defeasible premise that there is a proof that demonstates PP could be replaced by an
intuitively strict argument, if we chose to extend the model by the actual mathematical proof
from the literature that Zermelo is referring to here. But this would require also extending the
model with intuitively strict rules that formalize our semi-formal reasoning about syntactical
entities like proofs and their conclusions.
6Interestingly, a certain reasonable formalization of the terms demonstrates and uses in
terms of the (historically later) formal systems ZF and ZFC gives the second defeasible premise
a reading which is still an open problem in set theory to this day: It is still unknown whether
the full force of the Axiom of Choice is needed to prove the Partition Principle, or whether
a weaker choice principle is sufficient (though it is known that the Particion Principle cannot
be proved in ZF alone).
5
of AC to the conclusion that it is widely used, we add the following scheme7 of
defeasible rules to our model:
∃p, t (demonstrates(p, t) ∧ uses(p, ρ))⇒ widely used(ρ)
It is clear that Zermelo puts forward his claims about the simplicity of, the
wide use of and the lack of doubt about his principle AC in order to corroborate
the acceptability of AC as a basic mathematical principle that does not require
mathematical proof. In other words, he implicitly makes use of a metamathe-
matical principle, according to which the simplicity of, wide use of and lack of
doubt about a mathematical principle allow one to defeasibly infer the accep-
tibility of said mathematical principle. This is formalized through the folowing
scheme of defeasible rules:
simple(ρ),widely used(ρ),¬∃x calls to doubt(x,usage(ρ))⇒ accept(ρ)
Now that we have presented all the rules require to formalize this argument
of Zermelo in favour of the acceptibility of AC, we describe the arguments that
Zermelo constructs from these rules:
Z041 = (⇒ simple(AC))
Z042 = (⇒ ¬∃x calls to doubt(x, usage(AC)))
Z043 = (⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, PP ))
Z044 = (⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, PP ) ⊃ uses(p,AC)))
Z045 = (Z
04
3 , Z
04
4 ` ∃p, t (demonstrates(p, t) ∧ uses(p,AC)))
Z046 = (Z
06
5 ⇒ widely used(AC))
Z047 = (Z
06
1 , Z
06
6 , Z
06
2 ⇒ accept(AC))
4 Peano’s response to Zermelo’s proof
In 1906, the Italian mathematician Giuseppe Peano published a note in the Ren-
diconti del Circolo matematico di Palermo in which he responded to Zermelo’s
proof [Peano, 1906] by criticizing his principle AC. First of all, he points out
that he had previously considered and rejected this inference pattern:
“This assumption, which occurs in several books, was already con-
sidered by me in the year 1890, in Math. Ann., 37, p. 210: ‘one may
not apply an infinite number of times an arbitrary law according to
which to a class a is made to correspond an individual of that class
. . . ’ ” [Peano, 1906, p. 208]
Note that this can be viewed as a counterargument against Zermelo’s claim that
the principle has been applied in mathematics “without hesitation”, based on
evidence that Peano himself has previously called this principle to doubt. We
formalize this counterargument as follows:
(ρP
06
1 )⇒ calls to doubt(Peano,usage(AC))
7It is a scheme, as ρ may be substituted by an arbitrary term of our language. The
particular instance of the scheme that we will make use of is the one where ρ is AC.
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Peano then explains how a single arbitrary choice from a non-empty class can
be formalized in his Formulario mathematico, a semi-formal notational system
for mathematical propositions and proofs that he had devised:
“the form of argument ‘if I arbitrarily choose an element x of class
a, then proposition p (which does not contain x) follows’ is reducible
to the form
∃ a (1)
x  a. ⊃ .p (2)
(1).(2). ⊃ .p
‘If there exists an a, and if from xa follows proposition p, then
proposition p may be affirmed.’
This is the form of argument called ‘elimination of x’ in Formulario,
V, p. 12, Prop. 3.1.” [Peano, 1906, p. 208]
Note that –apart from irrelevant notational differences – his elimination of x is
the same as our rule scheme ∃-Elim.
The point that Peano is making here is that for any informal argument that
makes one arbitrary choice, there is a formalization of this argument in his
Formulario system that makes use of elimination of x once. We formalize this
by the following defeasible premise:8
⇒ ∀a, b (arb choices(a, 1) ∧ formalizes(b, a) ∧ Formulario(b) ⊃ uses(b, x-elim, 1))
Here arb choices(a, n) means that argument a is an informal argument that
contains an inference step in which n arbitrary choices are made. uses(b, ρ, n)
means that b is a derivation that makes use of rule ρ n times.
Peano continues:
“The assumption of two successive arbitrary elements has the form:
∃ a (1)
x  a. ⊃ .∃ b (2)
x  a.y  b. ⊃ .p (3)
(1).(2).(3). ⊃ .p ”
[Peano, 1906, p. 208]
In this case, four propositions are involved (three hypotheses and a conclusion).
Note that in his semi-formal system the intermediate step resulting from just
one application of elimination of x does not need to be written down, whereas
in our fully formal system such an omission is not allowed, so that there are
actually five propositions involved in two consecutive applications of ∃-Elim).
The point that Peano is making here is that for any informal argument that
makes two arbitrary choices, there is a formalization of this argument in his
8Given that it is a statement about the connection between something informal and some-
thing formal, it is not purely mathematico-logical, but has a metamathematical character that
justifies the choice of a defeasible premise instead of an (intuitively strict) axiom.
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Formulario system that makes use of elimination of x twice. We formalize this
by the following defeasible premise:
⇒ ∀a, b (arb choices(a, 2) ∧ formalizes(b, a) ∧ Formulario(b) ⊃ uses(b, x-elim, 2))
At this point, Peano is ready to make his main argument against Zermelo’s
principle AC:
“The assumption of two arbitrary elements x and y leads to an
argument with three hypotheses (1), (2), (3), and a thesis (4). In
general the assumption of n successive arbitrary elements leads to
an argument which consists of n+2 propositions. Therefore we may
not suppose n =∞, that is, we cannot construct an argument with
an infinite number of propositions.” [Peano, 1906, p. 209]
To formalize this argument, we first need some rules that allow him to con-
clude the claims of the first two sentences of this citation from the above men-
tioned defeasible premises. Note that he makes a generalization about n ar-
bitrary choices from evidence about what happens in the case of one or two
arbitrary choice. This kind of generalization is of course not a mathematical
demonstration, but a common form of argumentation in the informal exposition
of mathematical ideas. So we formalize it as a defeasible rule:
∀a, b (arb choices(a, 1) ∧ formalizes(b, a) ∧ Formulario(b) ⊃ uses(b, x-elim, 1)),
∀a, b (arb choices(a, 2) ∧ formalizes(b, a) ∧ Formulario(b) ⊃ uses(b, x-elim, 2))
⇒ ∀n, a, b (arb choices(a, n) ∧ formalizes(b, a) ∧ Formulario(b) ⊃ uses(b, x-elim, n));
The property of his system that n applications of elimination of x lead to an
argument that involves n+2 propositions, on the other hand, can be considered a
mathematical statement about his system, so we formalize it using an intuitively
strict rule (which, given the lack of proof of this statement, is here just treated
as an axiom, i.e. an intuitively strict rule without antecedent):
 ∀n (uses(a, x-elim, n) ⊃ involves propositions(a, n+ 2))
For concluding the claim in the final sentence, we need two axioms that
formalize his mathematical assumptions that ∞ + 2 = ∞ and that there is no
Formulario argument that involves infinitely many propositions:
 ∞+ 2 =∞;
 ¬∃a (Formulario(a) ∧ involves propositions(a,∞))
These rules allow us to conclude that no informal argument that makes
infinitely many choices can be formalized in the Formulario. Peano considers
this an attack on the usability of Zermelo’s principle AC. Here Peano is making
the implicit assumption that an informal mathematical argument is acceptable
if and only if it can be formalized in the Formulario. To get an attack on AC,
we additionally need the premise that the acceptability of the Axiom of Choice
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implies the acceptability of some informal argument that makes infinitely many
arbitrary choices:
(ρP
06
4 )⇒ ∀a (accept(a) ≡ ∃b(formalizes(b, a) ∧ Formulario(b)));
 (accept(AC) ⊃ ∃a (accept(a) ∧ arb choices(a,∞)))
Now that we presented all the rules we require to model Peano’s argument
against Zermelo’s principle AC, let us describe the arguments that Peano con-
structs from these rules:
P 061 = (⇒ calls to doubt(Peano,usage(AC)))
P 062 = (P
06
1  ∃x calls to doubt(x, usage(AC)))
P 063 = (⇒ ∀a, b (arb choices(a, 1) ∧ formalizes(b, a) ∧ Formulario(b) ⊃ uses(b, x-elim, 1)))
P 064 = (⇒ ∀a, b (arb choices(a, 2) ∧ formalizes(b, a) ∧ Formulario(b) ⊃ uses(b, x-elim, 2)))
P 065 = (P
06
3 , P
06
4 ⇒ ∀n, a, b (arb choices(a, n) ∧ formalizes(b, a) ∧ Formulario(b) ⊃ uses(b, x-elim, n)))
P 066 = ( ∀n (uses(a, x-elim, n) ⊃ involves propositions(a, n+ 2)))
P 067 = ( ∞+ 2 =∞)
P 068 = ( ¬∃a (Formulario(a) ∧ involves propositions(a,∞)))
P 069 = (⇒ ∀a(accept(a) ≡ ∃b (formalizes(b, a) ∧ Formulario(b))))
P 0610 = (P
06
5 , P
06
6 , P
06
7 , P
06
8 , P
06
9 ` ¬∃a (accept(a) ∧ arb choices(a,∞)))
P 0611 = ( (accept(AC) ⊃ ∃a (accept(a) ∧ arb choices(a,∞))))
P 0612 = (Assume¬(accept(AC)))
P 0613 = (P
06
10 , P
06
11 , P
06
12 ` ⊥)
P 0614 = (ProofbyContrad(P
06
13 ,¬accept(AC)))
5 Zermelo’s response to Peano
In 1908, Zermelo wrote an article responding to multiple critiques of his proof
of the Well-Ordering Theorem. The article contains the following response to
Peano’s arguments:
“First of all, how does Peano arrive at his own fundamental prin-
ciples and how does he justify admitting them into the Formulaire,
since he cannot prove them either? Obviously, through analyzing
the rules of inference that have historically been recognized as valid
and by referring both to the intuitive evidence for the rules and to
their necessity for science – considerations which may be argued just
as well for the disputed Principles. This Axiom, without being for-
mulated in a scholastic manner, has been applied successfully, and
very frequently, in the most diverse mathematical fields, particularly
set theory, by R. Dedekind, G. Cantor, F. Bernstein, A. Schoenflies,
and J. Ko¨nig among others. Such extensive usage of a principle can
only be explained through its self-evidence, which, naturally, must
not be confused with its provability. While this self-evidence may be
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subjective to a certain degree, it is in any case an essential source of
mathematical principles, though not a basis for mathematical proofs.
Thus Peano’s statement, that self-evidence has nothing to do with
mathematics, does not do justice to obvious facts. However, what
can be objectively decided, the question of necessity for science, I
would like now to submit to judgment by presenting a series of el-
ementary and fundamental theorems and problems, which, in my
opinion, could not be settled without the Axiom of Choice.”
Zermelo continues by listing seven theorems of set theory, which he believed
not to be provable without the Axiom of Choice. Some of these theorems were
already widely considered as proven among set theorists of his time, e.g. the
theorem that a countable union of countable sets is contable. Others had been
implicitly assumed by many set theorists without explicit proof, e.g. that every
Dedekind finite set is finite. He also repeated in the list the Partition Principle
mentioned in his 1904 article.
In the second sentence of this quotation, Zermelo mentions three criteria for
admitting fundamental principles: being historically recognized as valid, being
intuitively evident, and being necessary for science. In this passage he seems
interested in providing strong evidence for admitting a fundamental principle by
satisfying all three of these criteria. We formalize this by the following defeasible
rule scheme:
hist rec as valid(ρ) ∧ int evident(ρ) ∧ nec for science(ρ)⇒ accept(ρ)
Zermelo cites the frequent usage of the Axiom of Choice as evidence both
for its being historically recognized as valid, and for it intuitive evidence. This
is formlized by the following rules:
⇒ used(Dedekind, AC);
⇒ used(Cantor, AC);
⇒ used(Bernstein, AC);
⇒ used(Schoenflies, AC);
⇒ used(Ko¨nig, AC);
used(Dedekind, ρ) ∧ used(Cantor, ρ) ∧ used(Bernstein, ρ)∧
used(Schoenflies, ρ) ∧ used(Ko¨nig, ρ)⇒ widely used(ρ);
widely used(ρ)⇒ hist rec as valid(ρ);
widely used(ρ)⇒ int evident(ρ);
Finally, the seven theorems that Zermelo puts forward as examples for where
the Axiom of Choice is needed serve as evidence for the Axiom of Choice being
necessary for science. As in the case of the Particion Principle that Zermelo
already mentioned in his 1904 article, the precise content of these theorems is
not of great importance for the argumentative power of his argument. So we
will replace the theorems other than PP , which we have already given a name
in Section 3, by the placeholder names Th2, . . . , Th7 corresponding to the
numbering used by Zermelo in his paper:
⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, Th2);
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⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, Th2) ⊃ uses(p,AC));
⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, Th3);
⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, Th3) ⊃ uses(p,AC));
⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, Th4);
⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, Th4) ⊃ uses(p,AC));
⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, Th5);
⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, Th5) ⊃ uses(p,AC));
⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, Th6);
⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, Th6) ⊃ uses(p,AC));
⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, Th7);
⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, Th7) ⊃ uses(p,AC));
∃p (demonstrates(p, PP ) ∧ uses(p, ρ)),∃p (demonstrates(p, Th2) ∧ uses(p, ρ)),
∃p (demonstrates(p, Th3) ∧ uses(p, ρ)),∃p (demonstrates(p, Th4) ∧ uses(p, ρ)),
∃p (demonstrates(p, Th5) ∧ uses(p, ρ)),∃p (demonstrates(p, Th6) ∧ uses(p, ρ)),
∃p (demonstrates(p, Th7) ∧ uses(p, ρ))⇒ nec for science(ρ)
Now the rules provided in this subsection can be combined into a new argu-
ment in favour of the acceptability of the Axiom of Choice:
Z081 =(⇒ used(Dedekind, AC))
Z082 =(⇒ used(Cantor, AC))
Z083 =(⇒ used(Bernstein, AC))
Z084 =(⇒ used(Schoenflies, AC))
Z085 =(⇒ used(Ko¨nig, AC))
Z086 =(Z
08
1 , Z
08
2 , Z
08
3 , Z
08
4 , Z
08
5 ⇒ widely used(AC))
Z087 =(Z
08
6 ⇒ hist rec as valid(AC))
Z088 =(Z
08
6 ⇒ int evident(AC))
Z089 = (Z
04
3 , Z
04
4 ` ∃p (demonstrates(p, PP ) ∧ uses(p,AC)))
Z0810 = (⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, Th2))
Z0811 = (⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, Th2) ⊃ uses(p,AC)))
Z0812 = (Z
08
10 , Z
08
11 ` ∃p (demonstrates(p, Th2) ∧ uses(p,AC)))
Z0813 = (⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, Th3))
Z0814 = (⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, Th3) ⊃ uses(p,AC)))
Z0815 = (Z
08
13 , Z
08
14 ` ∃p (demonstrates(p, Th3) ∧ uses(p,AC)))
Z0816 = (⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, Th4))
Z0817 = (⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, Th4) ⊃ uses(p,AC)))
Z0818 = (Z
08
16 , Z
08
17 ` ∃p (demonstrates(p, Th4) ∧ uses(p,AC)))
Z0819 = (⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, Th5))
Z0820 = (⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, Th5) ⊃ uses(p,AC)))
Z0821 = (Z
08
19 , Z
08
20 ` ∃p (demonstrates(p, Th5) ∧ uses(p,AC)))
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Z0822 = (⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, Th6))
Z0823 = (⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, Th6) ⊃ uses(p,AC)))
Z0824 = (Z
08
22 , Z
08
23 ` ∃p (demonstrates(p, Th6) ∧ uses(p,AC)))
Z0825 = (⇒ ∃p demonstrates(p, Th7))
Z0826 = (⇒ ∀p (demonstrates(p, Th7) ⊃ uses(p,AC)))
Z0827 = (Z
08
25 , Z
08
26 ` ∃p (demonstrates(p, Th7) ∧ uses(p,AC)))
Z0828 = (Z
08
9 , Z
08
12 , Z
08
15 , Z
08
18 , Z
08
21 , Z
08
24 , Z
08
27 ⇒ nec for science(AC))
Z0829 = (Z
08
7 , Z
08
8 , Z
08
28 ⇒ accept(AC))
Even though the conclusion of Peano’s argument P 0614 is the negation of the
conclusion of Zermelo’s new argument Z0829 , this does not constitute a direct
attack from Z0829 to P
06
14 . The reason for this is that the conclusion of P
06
14 is
attained by a proof by contradiction, and such a proof cannot be rebutted on
the top level. However, it is possible to construct from Z0829 an argument attack
on P 0614 by making use of some of Peano’s subarguments that Zermelo does not
intend to attack:
Z0830 = (Assume¬(∀a (accept(a) ≡ ∃b(formalizes(b, a) ∧ Formulario(b)))));
Z0831 = (Z
08
30 , P
06
5 , P
06
6 , P
06
7 , P
06
8 , P
06
11 ` ¬accept(AC));
Z0832 = (Z
08
29 , Z
08
31  ⊥);
Z0833 = (ProofbyContrad(Z
08
32 ,¬∀a (accept(a) ≡ ∃b(formalizes(b, a) ∧ Formulario(b)))));
Now Z0833 directly rebuts P
06
9 , which is a subargument of P
06
14 , so Z
08
33 indirectly
attacks P 0614 as well. This is how our model formalizes Zermelo’s attack on
Peano’s argument. Note that without taking into account preferences, there
would also be an attack back from Peano’s argument P 0614 onto Zermelo’s ar-
gument Z0829 . We explain in Section 7 how this is avoided through the use of
preferences.
6 Lebesgue’s and Hadamard’s letters
In this subsection, we extend the model with a somewhat simplified formaliza-
tion of arguments from two more mathematicians – Henri Lebesgue and Jacques
Hadamard – who had participated in this debate before Peano’s response. The
purpose of this addition to the model is mainly to illustrate the possibility of
attacks on classical inference rules in the context of such foundational debates.
In order to not complicate the exposition of the model much more, we simplify
the formalization of these arguments a bit, while acknowledging that this sim-
plification makes the formalization less faithful to the wording used by Lebesgue
and Hadamard than it could be.
In 1905, French mathematician E´mile Borel, who himself had critiqued Zer-
melo’s proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem, asked his colleague Henri Lebesgue
to comment on the proof. Lebesgue responded in a letter to Borel that shortly
afterwards got published together with four other letters on the topic in the Bul-
letin de la Socie´te´ mathe´matique de France [Hadamard et al., 1905]. Lebesgue
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rejected Zermelo’s statement that he had proved the Well-Ordering Theorem,
and a central statement in his justification for this rejection is the following:
“I believe that we can only build solidly by granting that it is im-
possible to demonstrate the existence of an object without defining
it.”
Lebesgue attributes this principle to the German mathematician Leopold Kro-
necker, who is now often considered a forerunner of later constructivist and
intuitionistic approaches to mathematics. Lebesgue does not make any precise
statement about which forms of inference involving existential statements are
acceptable and which ones are not. However, it is clear that he intends this to
be an attack on the existence claim that the Axiom of Choice makes, namely
that there exists a certain choice function. At the same time, it is fair to as-
sume that this statement puts him at odds with any non-constructive proof of
an existential statements. So in order to capture the argumentative force of
this claim, we assume that it implies (through two intuitively strict rules) both
a rejection of the Axiom of Choice (AC) and a rejection of double negation
elimination applied to an existential statement (¬¬-Elim∃x ψ). But in order to
keep the formalization simple, we do not formalize the internal structure of this
claim, but instead formalize it as a propositional variable.
Lebesgue does not put forward any argument to support this belief other
than attributing the idea to Kronecker. For this reason, we have decided to
model it as a defeasible premise:
(ρL
05
1 )⇒ existence proof requires definition;
existence proof requires definition ¬accept(AC);
existence proof requires definition ¬accept(¬¬-Elim∃x ψ)
Borel sent a copy of Lebesgue’s response to Jacques Hadamard, who reacted
to it in another letter, which was published together with Lebesgue’s letter in
the Bulletin de la Socie´te´ mathe´matique de France. In this letter, Hadamard
defends Zermelo’s proof against Lebesgue’s critique. In this letter, he calls the
following argument the “essence of the debate”:
“From the invention of the infinitesimal calculus to the present, it
seems to me, the essential progress in mathematics has resulted
from successively annexing notions which, for the Greeks or the Re-
naissance geometers or the predecessors of Riemann, were “outside
mathematics” because it was impossible to describe them.”
In order to keep the exposition of the model simple – just as for Lebesgue’s
argument – we will not analyse the internal structure of this claim, but just
formalize it as a propositional variable and defeasible premise, to which we
assign the argumentative force that it was intended to have by including rule
ρH
05
2 that allows it to be used to attack Lebesgue’s argument:
⇒ progress by accepting existence of undescribables;
(ρH
05
2 ) progress by accepting existence of undescribables⇒ ¬existence proof requires definition
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We can describe the arguments that Lebesgue and Hadamard construct:
L051 = (⇒ existence proof requires definition)
L052 = (L
05
1  ¬accept(AC))
L053 = (L
05
1  ¬accept(¬¬-Elim∃x ψ))
H051 = (⇒ progress by accepting existence of undescribables)
H052 = (H
05
1 ⇒ ¬existence proof requires definition)
Now while H052 rebuts L
05
1 directly and thus rebuts L
05
2 and L
05
3 indirectly,
L051 also rebuts H
05
2 . The preference ordering we consider in the next section
does not give a preference to one of these arguments over the other, so these
rebuts are successful in both directions. This looks like we have no way to make
up our mind between accepting Hadamard’s and Lebesgue’s arguments in the
current model. But assuming, as we will in the next section, that all rules in
Section 5 are prefered to ρL
05
1 , we can construct the following successful attack
on Lebesgue’s argument:
I1 = (Assume¬(existence proof requires definition))
I2 = (I1  ¬accept(AC))
I3 = (Z
08
29 , I2  ⊥)
I4 = (ProofbyContrad(I3,¬existence proof requires definition))
Now I4 rebuts L
05
1 . This is an example of an implicit argument that is not
explicitly stated in the debate that we model, but that can be derived from
other rules in the model. One of the strengths of our methodological approach
is precisely that it allows to identify such implicit arguments that no one has
put forward, but that could be put forward and that could have a relevance
influence on the outcome of the debate.
7 Preferences in our model
Without imposing preferences on the set of rules, all attacks in our model would
become practically bidirectional. By this we mean that even though there can
be a unidirection attack from some argument A to some argument B, in such
a case there will always be an attack back onto A from some argument B′ that
is closely related to B and accepted in the same circumstances as B. If we
had included in our model a formalization of the proof of the Well-Ordering
Theorem, then some attacks would have been unidirectional (not just formally,
but also in the practical sense just alluded) even without preferences, as they
would be undercuts of the use of the Axiom of Choice in the proof of the Well-
Ordering Theorem, but as the model stands currently, it does not involve such
undercuts.
In order to make the model more interesting and more realistic, it is therefore
a good idea to include in it some preference order on the rules, which gives rise
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to a preference order on the arguments. One drawback of our methodology is
that it gives no methodological guidance on how to select a preference order
on the rules. So for now, we just have to follow our common sense of the
relative strength of different rules and different argument. We will just specify
some instances of rules being prefered to other rules, leaving most pairs of rules
uncomparable on the preference order, as comparison is only needed for some
pairs of rules.
The defeasible (ρZ
04
2 ) of Zermelo’s 1904 argument, which claims that no
one has called the Axiom of Choice into doubt, is clearly weaker than Peano’s
defeasible rule (ρP
06
1 ) that claims that Peano has called the Axiom of Choice
into doubt, as Peano can know better than Zermelo what he has called into
doubt, and can even provide a reference to a publication, where he has called
this inference pattern into doubt in print. So we assume ρZ
04
2 < ρ
P 06
1 .
Furthermore, the rules that Zermelo requires for his 1908 argument are com-
paratively strong: For example, he makes claims about certain people having
used the Axiom of Choice implicitly, which can be verified by reading the proofs
produced by the mathematicians in question. The rule that allows him to con-
clude frequent usage of the Axiom of Choice from five cited instances of such
usage is clearly stronger than the similar rule from 1904, by which he made this
conclusion based on one instance of such usage. Also the central premise used to
conclude the acceptability of the Axiom of Choice based on three criteria seems
to be a philosophically strong point of his argument. In contrast, the two unsup-
ported rules that stand in conflict with Zermelo’s 1908 argumentation, namely
Peano’s rule ρP
06
4 , which claims that all acceptable informal mathematical ar-
guments can be formalized in the Formulario, and Lebesgue’s rule ρL
05
1 that
claims that proving the existence of an object requires defining it, are weaker
than those rules from Zermelo’s 1908 argumentation. So we assume that each
of ρP
06
4 and ρ
L05
1 is weaker than all the rules introduced in Section 5.
8 Depicting the relevant arguments
The specified set of rules of our model allow for infinitely many arguments to be
constructed, so that the EAF corresponding to the model will also be infinite.
However, only a small finite subset of this infinite EAF contains attacks that
are relevant for the overall status of the acceptability of the Axiom of Choice,
which was the focus of attention of the debate that we have formally modeled.
For example, an implicit argument similar to I4 could be built based on Z
04
7
instead of on Z082 9, but as Z
04
7 will not be accepted in any argumentative core
extension of the overall EAF, this implicit argument will also never be accepted.
In this subsection, we present only the small subset of relevant arguments, as
well as all defeats between them.
The restriction of the single argumentative extension to this set of relevant
arguments is {P 062 , H052 , Z0833 , Z0829 , I4}, which means that these argument are
accepted in our model, while {1406, Z042 , Z047 , L052 and L051 are rejected. Note
that this set of relevant arguments contains two arguments with conclusion
accept(AC), namely Z047 and Z
08
29 . While the first one gets rejected, the second
one gets accepted, so that overall, the claim accept(AC) gets accepted in our
model.
Of course, this acceptance of the Axiom of Choice in our formal model of
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P 0614
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08
33
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05
1
H052
I4
Figure 1: The relevant arguments and attacks from the example
the debate is to a certain extend an artifact of the choice of arguments that
we formalized and of the preference order that we imposed. We could have
gotten an opposite result if we had chosen to formalize only weak arguments in
favour of the Axiom of Choice and strong arguments against it, or if we had just
made significantly different judgements about the preference order on the rules
involved in our model. So at the current level of development, such a model
cannot be seriously defended as a method for deciding which side in a debate is
right. What it can do, however, is to help us discover relevant implicit arguments
like argument I4 in our model, to help us get a more precise understanding of
what assumptions are made and what is at stake in a given debate, and to point
towards weaknesses of the current methodology of structured argumentation
theory, like the lack of a methodological guidance for choosing a preference
order on the rules.
9 Conclusion and proposed extensions to the
model
The parts of the debate presented and formalized in this subsection were, of
course, only a small part of the debate that mathematicians had about the Ax-
iom of Choice in the early 20th century, and additionally some of the considered
arguments have been formalized in a simplified way. So it is obvious that the
model could be expanded to a more extensive formal model of that debate.
One obvious extension that has already been alluded to above is to include the
proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem, so that attacks on the Axiom of Choice
would also be attacks on the Well-Ordering Theorem, as actually intended by
the mathematicians involved in the debate.
Some of the points that were raised during the debate touch on other issues
from the foundations of mathematics that were discussed at the time. For
example, the German mathematician Felix Bernstein criticized Zermelo’s proof
of the Well-Ordering Theorem not for the usage of the Axiom of Choice, but for
its similarity to Burali-Forti’s Paradox [see Moore, 1982, p. 110]. Bernstein had
somewhat peculiar ideas about how Burali-Forti’s Paradox should be resolved,
ideas which later turned out not to be tenable, but which at the time led him
to think that the resolution of Burali-Forti’s Paradox also blocks the possibility
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of a construction that Zermelo used in his proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem.
The face that this idea of Bernstein, unlike rejection of the Axiom of Choice,
turned out to not be a viable position, should be explainable by a formal model
that incorporates his argumentation.
Zermelo wrote his 1908 response to his critiques [Zermelo, 1907] in conjunc-
tion with another paper [Zermelo, 1908], in which he proposed an axiomatization
of set theory including his new Axiom of Choice as well as other set-theoretic
principles. This axiomatization, which after later modifications by Fraenkel gave
rise to ZFC, also had to avoid the two set-theoretic paradoxes that were hotly
discussed at the time, namely Russel’s Paradox and Burali-Forti’s Paradox. An
interesting extension of the model from this paper would be one that covers
these as well as other competing resolutions to these paradoxes. This will also
bring into the picture the notion of explanation of a paradox defined in this
paper.
A model of the debate about these paradoxes could also be naturally com-
binedd with a model of the debate about semantic paradoxes like the Liar Para-
dox, which we have already looked at superficially in the model in Section 4
of Dauphin and Cramer [2017]. Semantic paradoxes are a topic that many
philosophical logicians continue to work on and that has given rise to a num-
ber of relatively novel non-classical logics like paraconsistent logic [see Priest,
2006], paracomplete logic [see Field, 2008] and substructural logics [see Beall and
Murzi, 2013]. This area of research is characterized by a combination of formal
rigour, philosophical depth and debate about the acceptability of various logical
principles, which is likely to make it a fruitful field for testing the applicability
of structured argumentation theory to debates in the formal sciences. As works
like that of Field [2006] show, the topic of semantic paradoxes is also connected
to the philosophical interpretation of Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem,
which has also been studied intensively within the philosophy of mathematics.
An overarching formal model of these foundational debates across multiple
formal sciences is certainly still a distant goal. But given the potential insights
that it could provide into foundational research in the long run, this distant goal
could become a driving force for research on structured argumentation models
of debates in the formal sciences.
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